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State Aid and City Needs:
An Examination oj
Residual State Aid
to Large Cities

John P. Pelissero
Texas A & M University
Dye and Hurley's (1978) conclusion that the states are somewhat more responsive to city
needs than the federal government was questioned on methodological grounds by Ward
(1981). The point of contention was Dye and Hurley's use of per capita measures of
state/federal aid and urban needs. The research reported here examines state aid to the fortyseven largest U.S. cities, and employs residual measures of state aid allocations before and
during the urban crisis. Multiple regression of residual state aid on social, economic, or fiscal
need indicators shows the states to have been very responsive to city needs over time, and
lends substantial support to the findings of Dye and Hurley.

Since the early 1960s cities have encountered a variety of persistent
problems that remain beyond their own means to resolve. A common
understanding among policymakers in the federal system is that large
cities have been unable to provide a smorgasbord of public services and to
cope with a variety of city problems without assistance from the federal
and state governments. In the late 1960s the "urban crisis" was recognized and addressed by a host of federal programs. But that situation has
not gone away. Today the crisis in the cities does not pervade the
media - it has been replaced by more urgent national and international
concerns. But the distress of the 1960s and 1970s is very much present in
large central cities of the 1980s.
The Reagan administration no longer wants the cities to look to the
• This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, 20-23 April 1983, in Chicago. I would like to thank David R.
Morgan for suggesting that I study this policy area and for his assistance and encouragement
throughout the project. I also want to acknowledge the helpful criticisms and suggestions of
Michael Cant, F. Ted Hebert, Keith Hamm, Kenneth Meier, Charles Wiggins, and two
anonymous reviewers.
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federal government as the "court-of-first-resort" to help resolve their
problems. This process of direct problem solving through federal fiscal
assistance may have been necessary in the 1960s, but the current administration wishes it to be replaced by other means. The "new" New
Federalism initiatives that the administration advanced in 1981 included
a large turnback of federal grant programs to the states. Along with
some federal dollars to help the states throughout most of this decade, the
Feds now want the states to become the courts-of-first-resort for the
resolution of city problems. Among many criticisms of Reagan's New
Federalism plans, the issue of the states' capacities to respond to urban
problems has been reised by skeptics. And many city government officials fear that the states will not be willing to accept the challenges of
this responsibility. Both concerns have their basis in historical fact: states
were often the least-prepared level of government to engage in any urban
problem solving. This paper looks at city problems and the ways that
states have responded to them during the past two decades.
A useful dichotomy of the myriad of problems perpetuating the crisis in
the cities is that offered by Tobin (1979, p. 10). One set of problems is
local in origin: mismanagement of city governments, inefficiency of
municipal operations, and outmoded political structures. These are
"problems of the city," and they may be remedied by the city in many instances. The second set of problems is really a mirror of national problems that are "centered in the city," such as poverty, crime, and substandard housing. These latter problems are shaped as much by national
forces as by local conditions. Thus, they frequently are regarded as requiring the assistance of higher-level governments, federal or state, to
achieve any resolution.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO CITY PROBLEMS

How have the federal and state governments responded to this need for
assistance? Until recently not much empirical research had been applied
to this question. However, in the late 1970s, studies of federal and state
aid targeting to needy cities became more common. Much of this
research has concentrated on the federal government's response to urban
problems. Saltzstein (1977) did a limited comparison of Texas cities'
federal aid receipts. He found virtually no relationship between federal
aid and common measures of local social and economic conditions.
The Saltzstein single-state study was followed by three more broadly
based cross-sectional research efforts which obtained much different
results. One, focusing on the needs of major U.S. cities in relationship to
federal aid allocations, was that of Cuciti (1978). This study, conducted
for the U.S. House of Representative's Committee on Banking, Finance,

918

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL.

46,1984

and Urban Affairs, examined the social, economic, and fiscal needs in
forty-five large cities. Five different programs of federal aid were found
to be related to at least one dimension of need in these cities. Contrary to
this finding, Dye and Hurley (1978) showed that per capita federal spending (both in total and by selected program) was only weakly related to
common measures of city need. Additionally, they found that federal
grants were somewhat less responsive to need than state grant programs.
Stein (1981a) also examined the relationship between per capita federal
aid and city needs. Like Cuciti, he found federal aid to be related to current need, as well as responsive to changes in city need, fiscal capacity, or
both (p. 338).
This growing body of literature on federal aid allocations is being met
by an enlarging set of studies on state aid targeting. l Dye and Hurley
(1978, pp. 203-6) looked at state grants and found them to be somewhat
more responsive to city needs than federal grants. However, their findings have been challenged by Ward (1981) on both methodological and
theoretical grounds. Ward has objected to Dye and Hurley's use of per
capita measures of aid. Arguing that total measures of state and federal
aid do bear strong relationships to the size (rather than proportion) of the
population in need (p. 87), Ward contends that these authors' conclusions
are invalid. Ward raises important methodological questions which are
discussed in more detail later in this paper.
A study by the National Governors' Association (NGA; 1979) looked at
both federal and state aid to distressed cities. Emphasizing the importance of funneling all federal aid for cities through the states, the report
analyzed the impact of federal and state aid upon four indicators of city
hardship, as explored in previous studies (Nathan and Adams, 1976;
Cuciti, 1978). The NGA study concluded that responsiveness to city
problems is best met by a combination of federal and state aid. From a
somewhat self-serving perspective, it urged the federal government not to
bypass the states when attempting to assist distressed cities. Because the
states are closer to the needy communities, the governors' report suggested, the states could assemble a better aid package for cities with the
help of federal monies. In general, the NGA study lends support to the
findings of Dye and Hurley.
Further support for these findings appears in two related analyses of
state aid to cities by Stein (1981b, 1982). Focusing on per capita state aid
to cities in relation to multiple indicators of social and fiscal need, Stein
found state aid (in a pooled sample of cities) was responsive to measures of
need. However, an important caveat was that this finding did not hold
I For example, see the special issue of The Urban Interest 3 (1981) on "Targeting State and
Federal Resources to Urban Areas," edited by Vincent L. Marando and Ulf Zimmerman.
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true across all states. Emphasizing that there are fifty separate and
distinct state aid systems, Stein subsequently analyzed the targeting of aid
in each of the states and concluded that only a handful of states were actually good targeters of aid. As a result, Stein noted that the findings of
such studies as Dye and Hurley and NGA were misleading. The overall
positive responsiveness to need was likely to have resulted from the actions
of those few states which are "consistent targeters" of their needier cities
(Stein, 1981b, pp. 53-55).

Measuring State Aid.
Studies of state aid have shared one commonality - most of the data on
state aid allocations have been in per capita form. Dye and Hurley,
NGA, and Stein all relied upon per capita measures of aid in their
analyses. Ward (1981) raised important questions about using per capita
figures in such research, and he drew upon issues raised by Uslaner (1976)
to make his arguments. Yet, if one relies upon total measures of state aid
and the total level of need (rather than percentage in need), one runs the
risk of confirming the obvious. That is, total state aid (state spending) is
strongly related to the size of the city's population. An alternative
method to measuring state aid is explained below.
Uslaner's (1976) critique of per capita measures in regression analysis
demands that researchers consider the theoretical relevance of per capita
dependent and independent variables before employing them. His concern rests upon the ideas advanced by Cortes and Przeworski (1971)
which suggest that the theoretically meaningful variables (in such areas as
state expenditure analysis) are the total figure - not per capita transformations. As Uslaner notes, "State legislators generally deal in absolute
dollar and cent terms when deciding the level of state expenditures. There
is no evidence that the expenditures of other states serve as a baseline for
any individual state" (1976, p. 131). The only theoretically justified use
of per capita transformations, according to Uslaner, is in comparing cases
on indicators such as relative deprivation, or when one has information
that the per capita measures were used in the policymaking process.
Uslaner's argument and his empirical results raise important questions
for those who study state and urban policy. If per capita measures are inappropriate, "nonlinear transformations of the original data" (Uslaner,
1976, p. 126), then the more common alternative would be to employ the
total figures. This is suggested by Ward (1981) in his examination of Dye
and Hurley's (1978) measurement of state and federal responses to urban
needs. Ward shows that per capita measures may distort policy analysis
by indicating that there is a negative or weak association between per
capita federal aid outlays and percent needy when the correlation be-
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tween total outlay and number in need is actually quite strong and
positive (pp. 85-87). He does note that the latter finding is somewhat expected since many commonly employed need measures (e.g., elderly,
poor population) are also strongly correlated with city population.
Thus we return to the very concern that lead Dye and Hurley as well as
other policy researchers to use per capita measures in studying responsiveness to need. That is, one finds that larger cities receive more
state/federal aid because they are larger. An alternative approach is to
concentrate the policy analysis on that portion of state aid not determined
by the population of the receiving jurisdiction. As explained below, this
method should satisfy the concerns of both Uslaner and Ward while
avoiding the pitfalls of confirming the obvious relationship between size
of city and size of outlay. By regressing total state aid figures on city
population one can produce residuals that are both useful measures of
state aid and improvements over per capita transformations.
In a practical sense, the confounding effects of population should be
removed from the state aid measure.
This assumes that state
aid = j(population) + error.
Recognizing this, previous policy
analyses have controlled for population differences by employing per
capita measures. But through the method suggested here, the population
effects are removed in a linear fashion and residual state aid measures that
are independent of population are produced (Wonnacott and Wonnacott,
1970, pp. 38-39). The residuals represent that portion of state aid money
allocated on bases other than the size of the receiving city. Most decisions
about public revenues are political decisions. Thus, the residual portion
may include political considerations, as well as city needs or other factors
important to state legislators.
Residual measures, it can be argued, are better than per capita
measures for several reasons. First, while per capita measures are produced by nonlinear transformations, residual measures are derived from a
linear transformation that makes them well suited for use in subsequent
analyses with the general linear model.2 Second, residuals are considered
to be independent of the predictor used to produce them. That is, the
general linear model assumes that residuals will be uncorrelated with
population and, therefore, independent of this predictor (Kmenta, 1971,
pp. 201-5; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1970, pp. 152-53). One can test
empirically for independence by calculating the zero-order correlation
between population and residuals. Independence can be demonstrated if
2 Uslaner (1976) has adequately discussed and criticized the nonlinear transformations
that yield per capita measures. Residuals are appropriate to use in the general linear model
because they should meet the basic assumptions of the regression model (Kmenta, 1971, p.
202), particularly those of normality, zero means, and independence.
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this correlation equals (or nearly equals) 0 (see the research design section
below).
Third, residual measures allow the policy researcher to concentrate on
the discretionary portion of state aid allocations and to draw conclusions
from this analysis about the importance of needs, politics, and other factors. There is less certainty, when employing per capita measures, that
only the nonpopulation-determined portion of an outlay is being examined.
Finally, residual analysis allows the calculation of residual independent
variables as well as dependent (state aid) variables. In this policy area,
the independent variables used as predictors of state aid are indicators of
city need or distress. Producing residual need measures is important in
state aid analyses since many indicators of city need used as predictors of
state aid are also strongly correlated with population (Ward, 1981).
In sum, the employment of a residual measure offers significant advantages to policy researchers which are not present in the use of per capita
transformations. A more theoretically relevant measure is produced
which should allow for a more accurate assessment of state aid policies.

Explaining S~ate Aid Outputs
Several explanations for the distribution of this residual state aid seem
plausible. For example, we might consider the very factors that have
been empirically linked with state spending. The capacity of the state
fiscal system might explain the residual allocation to cities. States with
stronger revenue capacities may be in a better position to send additional
money to cities beyond that which might correspond to a city's fair share
in terms of population. Despite the current revenue constraints confronting many states due to national or regional economic conditions, the states
have improved their revenue capacities in recent years to respond to communities that have more distress than others (see the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981a, pp. 33-35; 1981b; 1981c;
Lawson and Stenberg, 1982; and Cohen, 1982).
A second possible explanation involves the legal/structural relationship
between a state and its cities (Morgan and England, forthcoming). States
with more decentralized arrangements for the provision of services may
be expected to give more money to cities than states of a highly centralized
structure. Support for this hypothesis is found in the research of Stephens
and Olson (1979; also, Stephens, 1974). Although they examine state and
local rather than state and city financial relationships, their finding that
centralized states tend to "give less money to their local entities than those
with decentralized arrangements" (1979, p. 59) has application to cities as
well.
Several state political factors may also be considered as potential
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stimuli of residual state aid. State-level forces behind the political explanation may include interparty competition (Cnudde and McCrone,
1969; Sharkansky and Hofferbert, 1969; Carmines, 1974; and Tompkins,
1975), legislative professionalism (Grumm, 1971; Carmines, 1974), or the
policy innovativeness of the state (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; and Savage,
1978). Another important political factor may be the degree of urbanrural conflict in the legislature. States with strong urban interests in the
legislature may be expected to produce more prourban legislation, including intergovernmental aid for cities. Other state-level explanations
are the socioeconomic characteristics of states-such as size, metropolitan
population size, rate of growth, or regional location.
A final consideration may be the level of need in a community. When
all other factors are ruled out, it seems entirely plausible that city distress
ought to be the most relevant variable in state aid allocations. The focus
of this research is on the degree to which the level of need in communities
is determinant of residual state aid receipts.

Sample Considerations
One feature that is not common among the studies of state aid is sample
size. Dye and Hurley looked at 243 central cities of Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). The NGA report was based upon
data from fifty-nine selected central cities, while Stein analyzed 845 cities
with populations of 25,000 and above. There appears to be some basis
for focusing a study of city need or distress on a sample of large cities.
For example, Netzer (1970) suggested that the concentration of poverty
and racial problems, physical deterioration, and imbalances between
service demands and tax resources were most severe in the largest central
cities (populations of 500,000 or more) in the U.S. While tax bases were
deteriorating in large cities, especially in the Northeast and Midwest,
spending (per capita) increased by a faster rate in the twenty-eight largest
cities than in all local governments from 1962 to 1972 (Peterson, 1976, p.
41). Between one-quarter and one-third of the poor in the U.S. resided
in the nation's central cities from 1959 into the 1970s (Gorham and
Glazer, 1976, p. 21) - a proportion that grew larger in later years.
In addition, several studies of city problems have substantiated the
acute distress in the largest U.S. cities. Nathan and Adams (1976) found
significant problems in more than half of the fifty-five largest central
cities studied. Analyses of fiscal problems in large city samples of forty
(Schmid et aI., 1975) and thirty (Dearborn, 1977) communities each
disclosed serious fiscal needs among large municipalities. Bunce (1976)
examined needs in cities of different sizes and confirmed that greater need
for community development-related policies existed in the largest north-
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eastern, midwestern, and southern cities. Finally, Cuciti's (1978)
research for the U.S. House of Representatives was focused on forty-five
of the largest cities. She found "above average" problems on different
dimensions related to social, fiscal, or economic need in most of the cities.
The weight of this empirical research suggests that major problems
associated with the urban crisis were quite serious in the largest U.S.
cities.
Further, one could argue that the states should be more aware of problems in their larger cities. Teitelbaum, Arnold, and Lyttle (1981) suggest
that key state officia.ls might be "more cognizant of the needs of their
larger cities." Such an assertion can be supported by the types of information available to state officials about cities. Most of the media centers
are located in the states' largest cities - focusing on both national and
metropolitan news. Governors have begun to establish liaison or
"regional" offices in large cities. Metropolitan representatives now
dominate many state legislatures. Finally, state departments of community affairs, advisory commissions on intergovernmental relations, and
other state-local bodies provide current information on urban
needs - including major city needs - to state officials (Advisory Commission, 1981c). Together, these information sources keep governors,
legislatures, and agencies aware of major city problems.
Empirical support for the suggestion that more attention is given to
large cities is also available. For example, Sharkansky's (1975) analysis of
state and federal aid to cities revealed that states were giving almost three
times as much aid to cities of over 500,000 than was the federal government. And "the states are giving the greatest aid to the largest cities, and
are increasing most the aid to those cities. From 1964-65 to 1972-73
state aid per capita to cities over 500,000 population increased by 270 percent, while per capita aid to other cities increased by 211 percent" (p. 92).
In summary, three issues appear to be important to understanding the
relationship between state aid and city need. First, one would do well to
analyze state-level as well as city-level variables in seeking to explain state
aid responsiveness to urban needs. This approach was used by Morgan
and England (forthcoming). Second, one's choice of sample should consider groups of cities with more severe problems that might be expected to
evoke some state response. But the most critical factor to address is the
proper way to measure state intergovernmental aid to cities. The
analysis described below concentrates on the residual portion of state aid
which is unrelated to city population size. Thus, this study looks beyond
the fair-share allocation to the part of state aid that may be determined by
consideration of differential needs in cities.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

The analysis that follows is an examination of residual state aid to
cities. The hypothesis is that residual state aid expenditures to cities are
largely determined by city needs. The research question addressed is:
how responsive is residual state aid to city needs? More specifically, how
important are measures of city need in the determination of residual state
aid monies? The second question to be examined is: what aspects of city
need are most strongly linked to residual state aid received? The final
issue to be addressed is: has the importance of city needs in determining
residual state aid chaqged over time?

Sample
The units of analysis in this study are cities - the forty-seven largest
U.S. cities with 1970 populations of at least 300,000 (see Appendix).3 This
group of large cities is similar to samples used in several analyses mentioned above, particularly those of Nathan and Adams (1976) and Cuciti
(1978). Such a sample gives attention to cities with empirically
documented distress and to the major urban population and problem
centers in states.
The analysis takes place for two time periods-1962 and 1976. The
first point was chosen because, although problems were beginning to
develop in cities at this time, the importance of the problems had not yet
caused policymakers in state capitals - but more particularly in
Washington - to begin funneling massive aid monies to cities. Also, the
early 1960s was a period when states were considered to be the "weak
sister" in the intergovernmental picture (Martin, 1965, p. 77; Sundquist,
1969, pp. 261-66). The choice of 1962 as the first point of analysis is purposely intended to reflect the condition of state aid to cities at a time when
states were not thought to be attuned to urban affairs. The second time
point, fifteen years later, was selected to allow for an examination of the
states' responses to the urban crisis. A basic assumption here is that a
significant change would have taken place from that observed in 1962.
This change is one that could be attributable to the heightened emphasis
on the urban crisis.

Measures of State Aid
The dependent variables include total intergovernmental revenue from
state government received by the sample cities in 1962 and 1976. 4 As
3 Washington, D.C. is not included among the largest cities because it is not a political
subdivision of a state.
4 The revenue data are drawn from U.S. Bureau of the Census, City GO(;Cnlll!ellt
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reported by the Census Bureau, this measure includes state grants-in-aid,
state-city revenue sharing, reimbursements, and payments in lieu of
taxes. The state aid data also include federal pass-through aid. Most of
the pass-through money goes to support local education and welfare programs. 5 Few cities included in the sample receive large amounts of
federal pass-through funds because school districts or county governments
are generally the recipients of school and welfare money, respectively. A
small number of cities in this sample do receive large amounts of education and welfare pass-through funds (e.g., New York). The inclusion of
data on these few cities is not expected to be problematic in the analysis
that follows.
Accepting the arguments of Uslaner (1976) and Ward (1981) on the use
of per capita measures, regression is employed here to produce residuals of
state aid. Preliminary analysis of the data in this study showed a simple
correlation between total state aid received and city population of .90 in
1962 and .88 in 1976. (Both correlations were significant below .001.)
These correlations suggest that 81 percent of state aid received in 1962
and 77 percent of that in 1976 could be explained by city population
alone. As previously addressed, the alternative to per capita methods for
achieving a population adjustment is made possible with regression. This
will allow the researcher to focus on the 19-23 percent of state aid that is
determined by factors other than population. To produce residual
measures the 1962 state aid data were regressed on the 1960 city population, while the 1976 data were similarly regressed on the 1975 population.
The resulting residuals are then employed as the dependent variables in
this study. The residuals for both years were found to meet the test of independence through a correlation of each with population. The simple
correlation between residual aid and population was - .008 for 1962 and
- .009 for 1976.

Measures oj City Need
Following previous research, the conceptual use of need in this study
follows the notion of three dimensions: social need, economic need, and
fiscal need. Social needs are the problems of people in the city. The
dimension includes problems related to poverty, crime, dependency (e.g.,
elderly), and so forth. The economic health of an area, or the second
Finances in 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), table 7; and City
Government Finances in 1975-76 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977),
table 7.
5 For example, in 1976-77 the total federal pass-through money to local governments was
$12.3 billion. Out of this total $10.1 billion, or 82.1 percent, went to support local education
and welfare.
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dimension, considers such conditions as home ownership, density of the
city population, and business health indicators. The fiscal need dimension taps the financial health or stress of city governments. This factor
includes such items as deficit spending and city service responsibilities.
Several indicators have been chosen for each need dimension. Because
of the relative importance of the needs of people, more measures of the
social dimension have been included. Just as the choice of using total or
per capita measures has been an issue, so too has the form of the independent variables (Ward, 1981). Initially, the decision was made to employ
the actual size of the population in need, rather than using the percentage
of it. However, as would be expected, population-related measures of
social need were found to be strongly associated with city population. To
achieve indicators of social need which would not be tied to population,
the social need measures were all regressed on population (for the appropriate year). The residuals generated are measures of social need
which are linearly adjusted for population. The indicators of social need
include: (1) nonwhite residual (minority population 1960, 1970); (2)
elderly residual (1960, 1970); (3) poverty residual (1960, 1969); (4)
mobility residual (population moving in previous five years, 1960, 1970);
(5) unemployment residual (1962, 1976); and (6) crime residual (serious
crimes reported 1960, 1975). All of the social need measures are
hypothesized to be positively related to residual state aid. Two measures
were chosen for the economic need dimension: (1) density (population per
square mile 1960, 1975), expected to be positively associated with aid;
and (2) home ownership (total owner-occupied housing 1960, 1970), anticipated to be negatively related to aid. Finally, the fiscal need dimension is represented by four indicators of the financial health and stress of
city governments: (1) budget deficit (general fund deficit spending total,
1962, 1976); (2) debt burden (total general debt as a proportion of general
revenue in 1962, 1976); (3) fiscal effort (general revenue/personal income,
1962, 1976); and (4) functional inclusiveness (city responsibility for
education and/or welfare services, 1962, 1976).6 All of the fiscal need indicators should show positive associations with residual state aid.
ANALYSIS

Table 1 reports the bivariate correlations between the three types of
need measures and state aid in 1962 and 1976. Two social need indicators were strongly related to residual state aid in 1962 - nonwhite
6 Similar to that suggested by Liebert (1974), the functional inclusiveness indicator is a
measure of the functional responsibilities of city governments. It is coded as follows: 0 - no
city welfare or education responsibility; 1- either responsibility; and 2 - responsibility for
both functions. This is a measure of city spending responsibility for these two services.
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( - .50) and mobility ( - .72). Although the negative correlations appear
to suggest that higher state aid payments were observed in cities with
lesser social needs, the signs lack substantive interpretation in analyzing
residual social needs and residual state aid. The signs changed as a result
of the residualization process that produced the new variables and are
statistical artifacts of the procedure. 7 Residual aid was positively correlated with three other measures of social need - elderly, poverty, and
crime- but none was significant in 1962. Neither of the economic ne~d
TABLE

1

BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESIDUAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AID FROM STATE GOVERNMENT AND CITY NEED INDICATORS
YEAR
INDICATORS OF NEED

Social Need
Nonwhite Residual
Elderly Residual
Poverty Residual
Mobility Residual
Crime Residual
Unemployment Residual
Economic Need
Density
Home Ownership
Fiscal Need
Budget Deficit
Debt Burden
Fiscal Effort
Functional Inclusiveness
N

1962

1976

- .50-

-.33.56.33*
-.68.10
-.32-

.24
.23
-.72*

.24

.07
- .18

.12
-.28*

.07
.37*
.54'

.18
.45.43-

44

47

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1962, 1972, 1977 editions; City Government Finances, 1962 and 1975-76 editions; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the U.S., 1962 and 1975 editions.
* p ,,; .05.
7 For additional explanation, note that both the dependent variable, state aid, and the independent variables representing social needs (i.e., nonwhite and mobility) are residual
variables not "totals" or the size of the social indicator. The original variables, when correlated, displayed positive correlations with one another. In other words, total state aid and
the size of the nonwhite (or mobile) population were positively correlated with one another.
But in several analyses the residual variables for aid and social need showed negative correlations. There is no substantive or theoretical explanation for this observation. The changes in
sign are statistical artifacts of the residuals procedure in regression analysis. For this reason,
the direction of the relationship between social need variables and the dependent variable is
not discussed in the paper.
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variables correlated highly with aid in this year. But two of the four
fiscal need measures did correlate in a moderately strong, positive
fashion. Functional inclusiveness had the second strongest correlation
among all need measures (.54), while fiscal effort showed a somewhat
smaller (.37), although still significant association.
Some support is found in table 1 for the hypothesis that city needs
should have been more strongly related to residual state aid in 1976 than
in 1962. By 1976 many states had reformed their government structures
to improve their capacity to respond to city problems. In addition, the
urban crisis that was going unnoticed in national and state legislative
circles in 1962 was weB beyond the point of discovery by 1976. This fact
lends support to the presumption that a change in state aid to cities should
be noticeable in the second time period. There were five significant correlations between residual state aid and social need indicators in 1976.
Mobility (- .68) and nonwhite (- .33) were again significant, although
the strength of the relationships had dropped slightly from the 1962 observations. The three social need indicators that increased in the level of
association by 1976 were elderly (.56), poverty (.33), and unemployment
(- .32). One economic need variable was found to be significantly
related to residual aid in 1976: home ownership ( - .28). This was also an
increase in the level of association from that observed in 1962. Finally,
the same two fiscal need measures were found to be correlated in a
moderately strong way with 1976 residual aid. While the measure of
fiscal effort increased in strength (.45) in the latter period, the functional
inclusiveness indicator was down slightly (.43) from 1962. Overall,
though, more measures of need were found to be associated with residual
state aid in 1976 than in the first year studied.

State Aid to Cities in 1962
Not all variables contained in table 1 could be used in the multivariate
analysis that follows. First, there was a multicollinearity problem between two of the fiscal need indicators: fiscal effort and functional inclusiveness in 1962 correlated at .88. Second, some of the independent
variables displayed virtually no association with the dependent measure
of residual state aid in table 1. To ascertain the actual level of importance of each of the independent variables in the determination of
residual state aid, a stepwise multiple regression procedure was
employed. The following tables display only those variables that made a
significant contribution to explained variance in this analysis. The independent variables are ordered according to the step in which they were
added to the equation.
As can be seen in table 2, mobility was the most important predictor of
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TABLE

2

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CITY RESIDUAL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REVENUE FROM STATE GOVERNMENT
BY NEED VARIABLES,

Ba

PREDICTORS
Mobility Residual
Nonwhite Residual
Fiscal Effort
Home Ownership
Constant
R =
.89

R2

=

F

=

-.482
- .418
9.797
-.000
-.493

1962
COEFFICIENTS
BETA'

j-value

-.484
-.404
.359
-.183

33.33
26.60
19.54
5.35

.79
35.41

• Unstandardized regression coefficient.
, Standardized regression coefficient (beta weight).

residual state aid (Beta = - .484). The second most important predictor, nonwhite, was also a social need indicator and had a similarly high
standardized regression coefficient (Beta = - .404). These two predictors were followed in step 3 of the analysis by fiscal effort (Beta = .359).
Cities making better fiscal efforts appear to have increased their residual
state aid by much more than cities with lower fiscal effort (b = 9.797).
Finally, home ownership was the last variable to enter the equation with
a significant regression coefficient (Beta = - .183). This combination
c~ social, economic, and fiscal predictors resulted in a significantly high
multiple correlation coefficient of .89 and an exceptionally high explained
variance of 79 percent. It is significant that fully 79 percent of the variation in residual state aid receipts among these cities was explained by
these measures of city need.
To see if the results would differ when fiscal effort was replaced with
the functional inclusiveness measure, the latter variable was used as a
predictor in a subsequent analysis. The results, shown in table 3, indicate that once again mobility and nonwhite are the more important
predictors of residual state aid. The functional responsibility measure of
city education and/or welfare responsibilities entered the equation third
(Beta = .373), as did the fiscal effort variable in table 2. Although home
ownership dropped out of this equation due to a lack of statistical
significance, the two social need variables plus the fiscal need predictor
do nearly as well as the four predictors in table 2. The multiple correlation coefficient in this latter analysis is still very high (.88), and the three
variables explain 78 percent of the variability in residual state aid receipts
in the sample cities. Overall, the results of the 1962 analysis indicate that
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3

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CITY RESIDUAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL
REVENUE FROM STATE GOVERNMENT BY SOCIAL NEED RESIDUALS
AND FUNCTIONAL INCLUSIVENESS,

1962

COEFFICIENTS
PREDICTORS
Mobility Residual
Nonwhite Residual
Functional Inclusiveness
Constant
R =
.88

R2

=

F

=

B"

BETAb

j-value

-.543
-.373
.551
-.209

-.544
-.374
.373

47.51
24.17
23.23

.78
46.74

" Unstandardized regression coefficient.
b Standardized regression coefficient (beta weight).

needs were very important in the determination of residual state aid in
this year. In fact, the need measures account for all but about 20 percent
of the variability in residual state aid in 1962 - a rather small proportion
of unexplained variance.

State Aid to Cities in 1976
The same stepwise process was used in the analysis of 1976 residual
state aid. The intercollinearity between fiscal effort and functional inclusiveness was again high in this period (r = .80). The analysis was
tried with each of the fiscal need measures employed in separate analyses,
but the resultant coefficients were so similar that only one of these products is displayed below. In table 4 the social need variables are, again,
found to be the stronger determinants of residual state aid. Mobility was
the strongest predictor (Beta = -.705) and entered in the first step.
Nonwhite entered on step 2, followed by fiscal effort in the third step.
Crime, a social need measure, and density, an indicator of economic
need, followed into the equation in that order. This combination of
three social, one fiscal, and one economic need predictors achieved a
significantly high multiple correlation coefficient (.95) and accounted for
fully 90 percent of the variation in residual state aid.
It is interesting to observe that only 10 percent of variation in residual
state aid for 1976 is not determined by the three dimensions of need. This
suggests that only a very small amount of residual state aid is determined
by factors not related to city conditions. Another noteworthy finding is
the greater importance of needs in this equation than in those analyzed
for 1962. Much more of the variation is explained by needs in the latter
period - after the urban crisis had been "discovered" and states had ini-
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tiated reforms in their governmental structures to accommodate urban
concerns - than in the pre-urban crisis period. This finding lends support to the assumption made earlier that residual state aid would be more
responsive to measures of city need in 1976.
TABLE

4

MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR CITY RESIDUAL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REVENUE FROM ST ATE
GOVERNMENT BY NEED VARIABLES,

1976

COEFFICIENTS
PREDICTORS

Mobility Residual
Nonwhite Residual
Fiscal Effort
Crime Residual
Density
Constant
R =
.95
R2 =
.90
F = 63.80

Ba

BETA"

j-value

-.711
-.484
7.035
1.042
-.000
-.123

-.705
-.462
.564
.257
-.400

140.21
71.40
49.52
21.55
26.33

Vnstandardized regression coefficient.
" Standardized regression coefficient (beta weight).

a

DISCUSSION

This study began with the basic hypothesis that residual state aid is
largely determined by city needs. The hypothesis was examined in relation to three research questions. First, how responsive is residual state
aid to city needs? The evidence from this research suggests that such aid
is very responsive to some common indicators of city need. A combination of social and fiscal need measures explained nearly 80 percent of
residual state aid receipts in 1962. A similar group of social, economic,
and fiscal need measures accounted for 90 percent of aid variation in
1976. One may reasonably conclude from these findings that state aid
programs have been responsive to city needs throughout the period.
A second question deals with the relative impact of the three need
dimensions in explaining residual state aid. It seems safe to conclude that
the social need dimension was the most important aspect of need among
the three factors examined. At least two social need predictors were
found to be salient in each equation, and in all cases the social need
measures were the strongest predictors of residual state aid during the
years examined. Fiscal need predictors seem to have less but still significant importance, especially in light of the contributions of both fiscal effort and functional inclusiveness in 1962 and 1976. The economic need
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dimension was found to be the weakest in all equations. This may be due
to the fewer number of indicators employed in the analysis compared
with the other dimensions. Since the social need indicators tap the needsof-people concept, and since the best representation of Tobin's (1979) notion of problems centered in the city may be social needs, it is perhaps fitting that states should be more responsive to this dimension.
The final question focuses on the possible changes in the importance of
needs over time. Needs were clearly important in the 1962 residual state
aid receipts. This observation is somewhat surprising since states were
not thought to be very responsive to urban concerns in the early 1960s.
During this period, the federal government was just beginning to create
large assistance programs for cities. States were still seen as the weak
sister in the intergovernmental picture, and cities very frequently turned
to Washington for help with problems. But despite the historical facts,
states apparently did a fairly decent job of considering needs in the
residual aid examined here. By 1976, state governments were even more
responsive to city needs as measured by the larger explained variation in
that year's analysis. This may have resulted from improved state government structures (including many recently established departments of
Community or Urban Affairs), increased representation of urban areas
following reapportionment, and heightened awareness in state capitals of
the plight of large cities.
The results of this analysis are the strongest findings yet in support of
the positive role played by the states in helping city governments. The
findings lend support to the works of Dye and Hurley (1978), the National
Governors' Association (1979), and Stein (1981b, 1982), which suggest
that states have been responsive to city needs.
While this research has looked at only one aspect of state responsiveness - targeting aid to urban needs - the findings have policy implications for cities. As addressed earlier, Reagan's New Federalism proposals
have been a source of concern to city governments that have not viewed
state government to be a good targeter of aid. The new administrative
mechanisms of New Federalism, along with smaller federal outlays, give
targeting additional meaning. State targeting will be very important to
needy cities that may get larger outlays. But at the same time, smaller
and less needy cities may suffer with smaller outlays due to state
targeting. All this considered, if the findings reported here for 1962 and
1976 continue into the 1980s, then cities may enjoy a sense of optimism (if
the resources are available) about state responsiveness to their problems.
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ApPENDIX
SAMPLE CITIES AND RESIDUALS FOR STATE AID,

RESIDUALS

CITY

Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbus, OH
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
EI Paso
Ft. Worth
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
Jacksonville, FL
Kansas City, MO
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Nashville
Newark
New Orleans
New York
Norfolk
Oakland
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
St. Louis
St. Paul
San Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
Seattle
Toledo
Tulsa

1962, 1976 (N = 47)

1962

1976

-0.052665
1.448543
0.172286
0.994821
0.304440
-3.692543
0.084595
-0.379636
0.200673
-0.371952
0.462201
-0.918175
n.a.
0.132223
0.515244
-0.774442
0.043367
0.373316
-0.021300
0.222357
-2.606741
0.088071
0.311751
n.a.
0.144274
0.052721
0.552586
0.251525
-0.062402
2.882318
0.441744
0.189179
0.212340
0.239467
-1.996730
0.444172
-0.160248
0.171460
-0.406380
0.389939
-0.199943
-0.077163
0.456781
n.a.
0.024870
0.286372
0.295231

0.222462
0.739595
0.424731
0.252000
0.526739
-3.595144
0.388359
-0.085000
0.057511
-0.392765
0.236433
-0.928426
0.248275
0.292816
-0.211323
-1.173084
-0.088067
0.067753
0.136775
0.358492
-3.048308
0.360995
0.057134
0.317831
0.027745
0.339365
0.279392
0.747812
0.069533
3.003731
0.552895
0.367913
0.291048
0.293244
-1.587506
-0.079462
0.172931
0.320251
0.104532
0.456875
-0.331036
-0.149104
0.026355
0.035464
0.145742
0.299679
0.341039

